In The Name of Allah, the Beneficent and the Most Merciful

Section: Traditional Discourses

Topic: On Compulsion and Delegation

A great number of traditions (narrated from the Imāms of Ahlu 'l-bayt - a.s.) says: "There is neither compulsion nor delegation (of power), but (there is) a position between these two (extremes)."

It is reported in ‘Uyūnu ’1-akhbār, through several chains: When the Leader of the faithful, ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib (a.s.) returned from Siffīn, an old man (who has participated in that battle) stood up and said: "O Leader of the faithful! Tell us about this journey of ours, was it by Allāh's decree and measure?" The Leader of the faithful said: "Yes, O Shaykh! By Allāh you did not ascend any elevation, nor did you descend to any valley but by a decree of Allāh and by His measure." The old man, there­upon said: "I leave to Allāh all my troubles (of this journey), O Leader of the faithful!" (‘Alī - a.s.) replied: "Have patience, O Shaykh! Perhaps you take it to mean a firm decree and a com­pulsory measure! If it were so, then there would be no justifica­tion of reward or punishment, no sense of command, prohibition or admonition, no meaning of promise or threat; there would not be any blame on an evil-doer nor any praise for a good-doer. Nay, the good-doer would have been rather more deserving of blame than the evil-doer, and the evil-doer rather more worthy of grace than the good-doer. (Beware!) this is the belief of the idol-worshippers and the enemies of the Beneficent God (who are) the Qadariyyah of this ummah and its Majūs. O Shaykh! Verily Allāh ordained (the sharī‘ah) giving freedom of will (to men) and prohibited (evil) to keep us on guard; and He gave plentiful (reward) on meagre (deeds); and He was not disobeyed by being overpowered, nor was He obeyed by compulsion; and He did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in vain; that is the opinion of those who disbelieve on account of the fire."

The author says: The topics of the speech of Allāh and His decree and measure were among the earliest about which the Muslims differed among themselves. This second dispute may be described as follows:

The eternal divine will govern every thing in the universe. These things are transient in their quiddity; but when they do exist, they do so because the will of Allāh decreed their existence - and in this way their existence becomes essential - otherwise, the divine decree would be meaningless. Conversely, when a thing does not exist, it is because Allāh did not decree its existence - and in this way its existence becomes impossible - otherwise, the divine will would be meaningless. In short, whatever exists, exists because Allāh has decreed its existence, - thus turning it into an essential being. This principle applies everywhere. But the difficulty arises when it comes to such a human action that issues from our own will and choice. We know that we can do it if we so desire, and can ignore it if we so wish. Their doing and not doing is equally possible to us. The balance is tipped in favour of either side by our own will and choice. Our actions are based on our choice, and our will brings them into existence. The difficulty that arises at this point is this: We have earlier seen that nothing comes into being without the will and decree of Allāh, which turns the thing into an essential being - if so, then how can any action of ours be termed as "possible" one? It must exist because the divine will has decreed it! Moreover, how can our will affect it in any way when it is governed by the will of Allāh? Also, in this background, it cannot be said that man had power to do a certain work before he did it. And, because he did not have that power, Allāh could not give him any order or command for or against that work. Going a step further, if Allāh gave him an order and he did not comply, it would mean that Allāh Himself had not wanted that thing to happen; so it was impossible for it to happen. Then the question would arise: How could Allāh order him to perform an impossible task? Conversely, if someone complied with that order, it was because Allāh Himself wanted it to happen. Then why should the man be rewarded without any valid reason? By the same reasoning, a sinner should not be punished, as it would be against justice, a naked oppression. One may go on enumerating the difficulties arising out of this subject. A large number of Muslims felt obliged to admit, and believe in, all these absurdities. They said that:

Man does not have power to do a work before the time comes to do it. The reason has nothing to do with the merit or demerit of any action. Whatever Allāh does becomes good; and whatever He forbids becomes evil.

Accordingly, Allāh may choose an action without any justification; He may give reward without any cause; He may ordain laws beyond the capacity of the doer or agent; He may inflict punishment on a disobedient servant even though the said disobedience and transgression was not of his doing.

It appears that the old man, who had asked the question, thought that the belief in the divine will and decree meant that there was no merit or demerit in any action and that man had no right of any reward (or punishment). Naturally he was dis­appointed when he heard that the journey was by the decree of Allāh; that is why he said: "I leave to Allāh all my troubles." What he meant was this: My journey to Siffīn and back and my fighting in the way of Allāh had no benefit for me as it was governed and done by the will of Allāh; my share in all this venture was only the trouble and the inconvenience which I underwent. Therefore, I shall leave it to Allāh to balance my account, as it was He Who put me through all these troubles. The Imām (‘Alī) replied to him by saying, "If it were so, there would be no justification of reward or punishment . . . " The Imām pointed to the rational principle on which the legislation is based. And at the end he reasoned that Allāh did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in vain. If Allāh could will the man's actions in a way as to deprive him of his freedom of will and choice, it would mean that He could do things without any purpose and aim; then He could create the whole creation aimlessly and in vain. This in its turn would render the principle of resurrection and reward and punishment invalid too.

It is narrated in at-Tawhīd and ‘Uyūnu ’l-akhbār that ar-Ridā (a.s.) was asked about compulsion and delegation, and he said: "Should I not teach you in this regard a principle by which you shall never differ (among yourselves), and no one will argue with you on this subject but that you shall defeat him (by it)?" We said: "(Teach it to us) if you so please." Thereupon he said: "Verily Allāh is not obeyed through compulsion, nor is He dis­obeyed by overpowering; and He did not leave the servants remiss in His kingdom; He (still) owns what He has given into their possession, and has power on what He has put into their power. Now, if the servants decided to obey Him, He would not prevent them from it, nor would he put any obstruction to it; and if they decided to disobey Him, then if He pleased to bar their way to it He would do so, and if He did not hinder it and they com­mitted it, then it was not He Who led them into that (sin)." Then the Imām said: "Whoever would accurately delineate the boundaries of this speech would surely overcome his adversary."

The author says: Why did "al-Mujabbirah" (the believers in compulsion ) say what they said? It was because they pondered on the divine decree and measure, and it led them to the conclusion that when Allāh decrees a thing it must happen inescapably. Their deliberation of this subject was correct, and so was the conclusion arrived at. Where they fell in error was in correlating that conclusion with reality; they did not under­stand the difference between a reality and an idea based on sub­jective approach; they forgot the distinction between essentiality and possibility.

It is correct to say, on the basis of the divine decree and measure, that nothing happens in this world unless it turns an essential being; it is because every thing and every affair comes into being when it is decreed by Allāh, according to the measure prescribed by Him; and then it cannot fail to happen, otherwise the decree of Allāh would fail. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that a transient or possible thing becomes essential because of its sufficient cause. When looked at in conjunction with its sufficient cause, it would be called "essential"; but separated from that cause, it would remain as it was before - a transient or possible thing. Let us look at an action of man which he does by his free will and choice. When we look at it in relation to all things that are necessary to bring it into being - knowledge, will, proper tools and organs, the material, formal, efficient and final causes, and all the conditions of time and space - it will become an essential being; and it is in this context that it become subject of the eternal divine will. In other words, it becomes an essential being when all aspects of its sufficient cause are com­plete. But, looked in relation to each of those aspects separately, it remains only a transient and possible thing. If it is seen vis-à-vis its efficient cause only, that is, in relation to the doer only, it will retain its characteristics of transience and possibility - it will not become an essential being.

It is now clear to see at which point the believers in "com­pulsion" have deviated from the right path. They thought that, inasmuch as the human action was subject to the divine will and decree, man had no power on it; he was not a free agent; he was rather a helpless tool in divine hands. But they did not take into consideration the fact that the divine will takes it into hand only when all aspects of its sufficient cause are complete, and not before that. The divine will decrees that a certain action be done by Zayd - not unconditionally, but on the condition that it is done by Zayd's free will, at a certain time and a certain place. Therefore, its relation to the divine will itself demands that it should be an action of a free agent, done by his own free will and choice.

Doubtlessly, that action will be called an "essential" one if seen in relation to the divine will; but at the same time and by virtue of the same divine will, it will be a possible and transient action when related to the doer, that is, the man. In other words, there are two wills - the human and the divine; they do not run parallel to each other; the divine will comes after and above the human will - they are in a vertical, and not a horizontal position to each other. Therefore, there is no competition or collision between the two wills. It was a short-sightedness on part of the believers in compulsion to negate the human will in order to establish the divine one.

The Mu‘tazilites said that human actions are done by man's free will. But they went to the other extreme, and fell in an error no less objectionable than that of al-Mujabbirah. They too said that if human action was subjected to the divine will man would not have any freedom of will and choice. And then they took a position diametrically opposed to that of al-Mujabbirah, and came to the conclusion that the divine will had no relation what­soever to the human action. Thus they had to accept another creator - the man himself - for human actions. In this way, they accepted dualism without knowing what they were doing. Going further they fell into traps more harmful than the belief of al-Mujabbirah. As the Imām has said: "The poor al-Qadariyyah, they wanted to emphasize the justice of Allāh, so they removed Him from His power and authority. . . "

A master, showing kindness to one of his slaves, married him to a slave-girl of his; he bestowed on him a property, gave him a well-furnished house and provided him with all the necess­ities of life. Then there came some people there, looked at his property, and began arguing among themselves. Someone said: "Even though the master has given this property to his slave and has made him its owner, the slave has no right in, or authority over, this property at all. Does any slave own any thing? The slave together with all his belongings belongs to the master."

Another said: "No. You are wrong. The master has bestowed on this slave the right of property. Now the slave is its absolute owner, and the master has lost all his rights, and authority over this property. We may say that he has abdicated in favor of his slave. "

The former was the opinion of al-Mujabbirah; the later that of the Mu‘tazilites. But both were wrong. The correct view would have been to say: The master has got his status of mastership; the slave his position of servitude and bondage. The master has made the slave owner of his (i.e., master's) property. The property belongs to the master at the same time that it belongs to the slave. There are two ownerships - one over the other. This is what the Imāms of Ahlu ’l-bayt (a. s.) have taught us to believe, and what the reason supports.

‘Abāyah ibn Rib‘ī al-Asadī asked ‘Alī, the Leader of the faithful, the meaning of "capability". The Leader of the faithful asked a counter question: "Do you have that capability without God or with God?" When ‘Abāyah remained silent, he told him, "Tell me, O ‘Abāyah!" He said: "What should I say? O Leader of the faithful!" He said: "You should say that you have got that capability by (grace of) Allāh, to Whom it belongs and not to you. If He made you its owner, it would be of His bounties, and if He took it away from you, it would be a trial from Him; and He is the Owner of what He gave into your possession, and has power over what He put under your power. . ." (al-Ihtijāj)

The author says: Its meaning may be understood from the preceding explanation.

al-Mufīd reports in his Sharhu ’l-‘aqā’id: It has been nar­rated from Abū ’l-Hasan, the third, (a.s.) that he was asked whether the actions of the servants were created by Allāh. He (a.s.) said: "If He were their creator, He would not have dis­owned their liability. And He (Allāh) has said: Verily, Allāh is free from liability to the idolators . . . (9:3). It does not mean that Allāh was not responsible for the creation of the idolators; what Allāh has disowned any responsibility of, is their idol­ worship and their evils."

The author says: There are two aspects of a deed - its actual existence, and its relation to its doer. It is only when an action is seen in relation to its doer that it is called obedience or disobedience, good or bad, virtue or sin. So far as actual existence is concerned, there is no difference between marriage and fornication. What distinguishes one from the other is the command of Allāh - marriage conforms with the divine law, and fornication goes against that law. Someone is killed without any reason; another is killed by a lawful authority in reprisal of a murder. A teacher punishes an orphan in order to guide him aright; an oppressor hits at the same orphan unjustly. In all these examples, the actual movements of the actions are identical. But one group is called sin because it does not conform with the divine law or goes against the common weal of the society.

Allāh says: Allāh is the Creator of everything. . . (39:62). Every action is a "thing" inasmuch as it exists. And the Imām has said: "Whatsoever may be called a thing is created, except Allāh. . ." Also, Allāh says: Who made good everything that He has created. . . (32:7). It may be inferred that everything is good because it is created. Creation and goodness are insepar­able factors. But at the same time, we see that Allāh has named some actions as evil. For example, He says: Whoever brings a good deed, he shall have ten like it, and whoever brings an evil deed, he shall not be recompensed but only with the like of it . . . (6 :160). These are obviously the actions done by man; not the factor of recompense which cannot apply to divine actions. Such a deed is called sin. It is evil because it lacks some thing; because it is a nullification of a spiritual virtue or social good. In other words, a sin is sin because it is a negation , a non-being; otherwise it would have been good.

Now, let us look at the following verses of the Qur’ān:

No misfortune befalls on the earth nor in your own souls, but it is in a book before We bring it into existence. . . (57:22); No affliction comes about but by Allāh’s permission; and whoever believes in Allāh, He guides aright his heart . . . (64 :11); And whatever affliction befalls you, it is on account of what your hands have wrought, and (yet) He pardons most (of your faults) (42:30); Whatever benefit comes to you, it is from Allāh, and whatever misfortune befalls you, it is from yourself (4:79); . . . and if a benefit comes to them, they say: "This is from Allāh;”- and if a misfortune befalls them they say: "This is from you." Say: “All is from Allāh;" but what is the matter with these people that well-nigh they do not understand what is told (them)? (4:78). On pondering upon these verses, it be­comes clear that these misfortunes are relative evils. A man is bestowed with the bounties of Allāh, like security and peace; health and wealth, and so on; then he loses one or more of these bounties. This misfortune, in relation to that man, is evil because it has nullified some existing things, that is, the bounties which he had previously enjoyed. Thus, every misfortune is created by Allāh, and at that stage it is not an evil. But it is an evil when seen in relation to the man who loses an existing bounty because of it.

Likewise, every sin is a negative factor, and as such, it is not to be attributed to Allāh at all; though it may be attributed to Him from another angle, inasmuch as it happens by permission of Allāh.

al-Bazanti said: I told ar-Ridā (a.s.) that some of our fellows believe in compulsion and some of them advocate the (belief of) capability. Thereupon he told me: "Write down (as I say): Allāh, Blessed and High is He, has said: ‘O son of Adam! By My will you have become such that you wish for yourself what you wish; and by My power you discharged the duties imposed by Me (on you); and by My bounty, you got power to disobey Me; I made you hearing, seeing (and) powerful. Whatever benefit comes to you, it is from Allāh; and whatever misfortune befalls you, it is from yourself. And it is as it is because I have more right on your good deeds than you have yourself; and you are more liable to your sins than Me. And it is because I cannot be questioned concerning what I do and they shall be questioned. Thus, I have arranged for you everything that you want. . .' " (Qurbu ’1-asnād)

This, or nearly the same, tradition is narrated through other chains, of the Sunnīs as well as of the Shī‘ahs. In short, the deeds that cannot be attributed to Allāh, are the sins per se. It further explains the sentence of the preceding tradition: "If he were their creator, He would not have disowned their liability . . . What Allāh has disowned any responsibility of, is their idol-worship and their evils. . . "

Abū Ja‘far and Abū ‘Abdillāh (a.s.) said: "Certainly, Allāh is too Merciful to His creatures to compel them to sin and then to punish them for it. And Allāh is too powerful for anyone to think that He would will a thing and it would not happen!" (The narrator) said: "Then they (a.s.) were asked: ‘Is there a third position between the (positions of) compulsion and (in­dependent) capability?' They said: ‘Yes, broader than (the space) between the heaven and the earth."' (at-Tawhīd)

Muhammad ibn ‘Ajlān said: "I asked Abū ‘Abdillāh (a.s.) whether Allāh has delegated (the authority of) the affair to the servants. He said: Allāh is too honourable to delegate (the auth­ority) to them.’ I said: ‘Then has He compelled the servants in their deeds?’ He said: Allāh is too just to compel a servant on a deed and then to punish him for it.’” (ibid.)

In the same book Mihzam is reported as saying: "Abū ‘Abdillāh (a.s.) said: "Tell me what is that concerning which our followers (whom you have left behind) have differed among themselves.’ I said: ‘About the compulsion and the delegation?’ He said: ‘Then ask me about it.’ I asked: ‘Has Allāh compelled the servants to (commit) sins?’ He replied: ‘Allāh is too over­powering to do it to them.’ I asked: ‘Then has He delegated (the authority) to them?’ He replied: ‘Allāh has too much power over them to do so.’ I asked: ‘Then what is it (i.e., the correct position)? May Allāh make your affairs right for you!’" (The narrator says:) "The Imām turned his hand twice or thrice, then said: ‘If I were to answer you concerning it, you would not believe.’”

The author says: “Allāh is too overpowering to do it to them”: Compulsion means that a force majeure subdues the subject in such a way that his power of action is nullified. "Too overpowering" (or, more overpowering than that) is the predomi­nant will of Allāh - He has willed that the action would emanate from the doer by his free will and choice, and this is what is actually happening in the world. The divine will has given the man freedom of will; neither the divine will negates the human will, nor the human will collides with the divine will.

It is reported in at-Tawhīd that as-Sādiq (a. s.) said: "The Apostle of Allāh said: ‘Whoever thinks that Allāh enjoins the evil and indecency, he tells a lie against Allāh; and whoever believes that the good and bad (do happen) without the will of Allāh, he removes Allāh from His authority.'"

It is reported that al-Hajjāj ibn Yūsuf wrote to al-Hasan al-Basrī, ‘Amr ibn ‘Ubayd, Wāsil ibn ‘Atā’ and ‘Amir ash-Sha‘bī, asking them to describe what they had got (and what has reached them) in respect of (divine) decree and measure. al-Hasan al-Basrī wrote to him: "The best thing that has reached me is that which I heard the Leader of the faithful, ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib (a.s.) saying: ‘Do you think that He Who has forbidden you has (also) acted cunningly against you? Rather, your lower and higher (parts) have cunningly deceived you, and Allāh is free from its liability.'" And ‘Amr ibn ‘Ubayd wrote to him: "The best thing I have heard about the decree and measure is the saying of the Leader of the faithful, ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib (a.s.): ‘If perfidy were in reality decreed, the perfidious man, if punished, would have been op­pressed.' " And Wāsil ibn ‘Atā’ wrote to him: "The best I have heard about the decree and measure is the saying of the Leader of the faithful, ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib (a.s.) : ‘Do you think that He would guide you to the path and (then) obstruct you (from moving on)?' " And ash-Sha‘bī wrote to him: "The best thing I have heard concerning the decree and measure is the word of the Leader of the faithful, ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib (a. s.) : ‘Whatever you have to seek Allāh's pardon for it, it is from you; and what­ever you thank Allāh for it, it is from Him.' " When their letters reached al-Hajjāj and he studied them, he said: "Certainly they have taken it from a clear spring." (at-Tārā’if )

It is narrated in the same book that someone asked Ja‘far ibn Muhammad as-Sādiq (a. s.) about the decree and measure, and he replied: "Whatever you may blame the servant (of Allāh) for it, it is from him; and whatever you cannot blame the servant (of Allāh) for it, it is the work of Allāh. Allāh will say to the servant: ‘Why did you disobey? Why did you transgress? Why did you drink liquor? Why did you fornicate?' This is, therefore, the work of the servant. But He will not say to him: ‘Why were you sick? Why were you of short stature? Why did you become white? Why were you black?(He will not ask it) because it is the work of Allāh."

‘Alī (as.) was asked about monotheism and justice (of Allāh), and he said: "Monotheism is that you should not imagine Him; and justice is that you should not accuse Him." (Nahju ’1-balāghah)

The author says: There are numerous traditions on this subject; but those quoted above throw light on all the aspects of the topic.

The above-mentioned traditions show various special methods of argument regarding the subject matter.

a) Some of them argue on the basis of legislation itself - order and prohibition; punishment and reward etc. - that man has freedom of will, without any compulsion or delegation of power. See, for example, the speech of the Leader of the faithful, ‘Alī (as.), replying to the old man. It is similar to the argument we have inferred from the words of Allāh.

b) Others bring in evidence the verses of the Qur’ān which cannot be reconciled with the theory of compulsion or delegation of power. For example: And Allāh’s is the kingdom of the heavens and the earth (3:189); and your Lord is not in the least unjust to the servants (41:46). Also, there is the verse, Say: "Surely Allāh does not enjoin indecency" (7:28) .

Poser: A deed may be described as unjust or indecent if it is seen in relation to us. But when it is attributed to Allāh it is not called unjust or indecent. Therefore, even if all "our" deeds were actually done by Allāh, it would be perfectly right to say that He is not unjust and does not enjoin indecency.

Reply: The sentence seen in the context leaves no room for such misconceptions. The complete verse is as follows: And when they commit an indecency they say: "We found our fathers doing this and Allāh has enjoined it on us " Say: "Surely Allāh does not enjoin indecency. Do you say against Allāh what you do not know?" Look at the sentence, "and Allāh has enjoined it on us". The pronoun "it" clearly refers to the indecency committed by them; and it is the same deed which is referred to in the sentence, "Surely Allāh does not enjoin indecency,". Allāh does not enjoin what is termed as indecency in context of human activities; it does not matter whether in other framework it is called indecency or not.

c) A third type of reasoning is based on the divine attributes. Allāh has given Himself many good names, and has described Himself with many sublime attributes, which cannot be squared with compulsion or delegation of power. Allāh is the Subduer, the Omnipotent, the Benevolent and the Merciful. These attributes can only be believed in if one believes that everything depends on Allāh in its existence, and that its defects and shortcomings can­not be attributed to Him at all. (Refer to the traditions quoted from at-Tawhīd.)

d) Yet others refer to seeking the pardon of Allāh as well as to the blame which society directs at the wrong-doer. If sin were not from the man himself, there would have been no mean­ing in asking for divine pardon. If all our actions were done by Allāh why should we be blamed for only some of them and not for the others?

e) Lastly, there are the traditions which explain the words, like causing to err, sealing the hearts and misleading, when they are attributed to Allāh:

ar-Ridā (a.s.) said explaining the words of Allāh, and He (Allāh) left them in utter darkness - they do not see: "Allāh is not described as leaving something as His creatures do. But when He knew that they would not return from disbelief and error, He held back His help and grace from them and let them alone with their choice." (‘Uyunu ’1-akhbār)

The same book narrates from the same Imām in explanation of the words of Allāh, Allāh has set a seal upon their hearts: "It is setting a seal on the hearts of the disbelievers as a punishment of their disbelief, as Allāh has said: . . . nay! Allāh has set a seal upon them owing to their disbelief, so they shall not believe except a few (4:155)."

as-Sādiq (a.s.) said concerning the words of Allāh, Surely Allāh is not ashamed to set forth any parable. . .: "This divine word answers those who think that Allāh makes (His) servants go astray and then punishes them for that straying . . . " (Majma‘u ’l-bayān)

The author says: Its meaning may be understood from previous explanations.

Philosophical discourse on compulsion and delegation

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